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Abstract
Many data analysis operations can be expressed as a GROUP BY
query on an unbounded set of partitions, followed by a per-partition ag-
gregation. To make such a query differentially private, adding noise to
each aggregation is not enough: we also need to make sure that the set of
partitions released is also differentially private.
This problem is not new, and it was recently formally introduced as
differentially private set union [GGK+20]. In this work, we continue this
area of study, and focus on the common setting where each user is associ-
ated with a single partition. In this setting, we propose a simple, optimal
differentially private mechanism that maximizes the number of released
partitions. We discuss implementation considerations, as well as the pos-
sible extension of this approach to the setting where each user contributes
to a fixed, small number of partitions.
1 Introduction
Suppose that a centralized service collects performance information on the re-
quests it receives. An engineer wants to understand how latency varies depend-
ing on the device model. They could run a SQL query similar to the following.
SELECT device model , AVG( la tency )
FROM database
GROUP BY dev ice mode l
Many common data analysis tasks follow a simple structure, similar to this
example query: a GROUP BY operation that defines a set of partitions (here,
device models), followed by one or several aggregations. To make such a query
differentially private, it is not enough to add noise to the aggregation: the set of
partitions present in the output must also be differentially private. This problem
was formally introduced in [GGK+20] as differentially private set union. Each
user is associated with one or several partitions, and the goal is to release as
many partitions as possible while making sure that the output is differentially
private.
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In [GGK+20], the main motivation to study this set union primitive is nat-
ural language processing: the discovery of words and n-grams is essential to
these tasks, and can be modeled as a set union problem. In this context, each
user can contribute to many different partitions. In the context of data analysis
queries, however, it is common that each contributes only to a small number of
partitions, often just one. This happens when the partition is a characteristic
of each user, for example demographic attributes or the answer to a survey.
In the above SQL query example, if the user ID is a device identifier, each
contributes to at most one device model. This work focuses on this particular
single-contribution case, and provides an optimal partition selection strategy for
this special case.
This paper is structured as follows. After discussing prior work in more detail
and introducing definitions, we present a partition selection mechanism for the
case where each user contributes to one partition, and prove its optimality. We
then discuss possible extensions to cases where each user contributes to multiple
partitions as well as implementation considerations.
1.1 Prior work
In this section, we review existing literature on the problem of releasing a set of
partitions from an unbounded set while satisfying differential privacy. This did
not get specific attention until [GGK+20], but the first algorithm that solves
it was introduced in [KKMN09], for the specific context of privately releasing
search queries. This algorithm works as follows: build a histogram of all par-
titions, count unique users associated with each partition, add Laplace noise
to each count, and keep only the partitions whose counts are above a fixed
threshold. The scale of the noise and the value of the threshold determine ε
and δ. This method is simple and natural; it was adapted to work in more
general-purpose query engines in [WZL+19].
In [GGK+20], the authors focus on the more general problem of differentially
private set union. The main use case for this work is word and n-gram discovery
in Natural Language Processing: data used in training models must not leak
private information about individuals. In this context, each user potentially
contributes to many elements; the sensitivity of the mechanism can be high.
The authors propose two strategies applicable in this context. First, they use
a weighted histogram so that if a user contributes to fewer elements than the
maximum sensitivity, these elements can add more weight to the histogram
count. Second, they introduce policies that determine which elements to add
to the histogram depending on which histogram counts are already above the
threshold. These strategies obtain significant utility improvements over the
simple Laplace-based strategy.
In this work, in contrast to [GGK+20], we focus on the low-sensitivity use
case: each user contributes to exactly one element. This different setting is
common in data analysis: when the GROUP BY key partitions the set of users
in distinct partitions, each user can only contribute to one element to the set
union. Choosing the contributions of each user is therefore not relevant; the
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only question is to optimize the probability of releasing each element in the
final result. For this specific problem, we introduce an optimal approach, which
maximizes this probability.
1.2 Definitions
Differential privacy (DP) is a standard notion to quantify the privacy guarantees
of statistical data. For the problem of differentially private set union, we use
(ε, δ)-DP.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy [DMNS06]). A randomized mechanism M
is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for any two databases D and D′, where D′ can
be obtained from D by either adding or removing one user, and for all sets S of
possible outputs:
P [M (D) ∈ S] ≤ eεP [M (D′) ∈ S] + δ.
In the main section of this paper, we assume that each user contributes to
only one partition; and the goal is to release as many partitions as possible.
In that case, each partition can be considered independently, so the problem is
simple to model. Each partition has a certain number of users associated with
it, and the only question is: with which probability do we release this partition?
Thus, a strategy for partition selection is simply a function associating the
number of users in a partition with the probability of keeping the partition.
Definition 2 (Partition selection primitive). A partition selection primitive is
a function pi : N → [0, 1] such that pi(0) = 0. The corresponding partition
selection strategy consists in counting the number n of users in each partition,
and releasing this partition with proability pi(n).
We say that a partition selection primitive is (ε, δ)-differentially private if
the corresponding partition selection strategy ρpi : N→ {drop, keep}, defined by:
ρpi(n) =
{
drop with probability 1− pi(n)
keep with probability pi(n)
is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Note that partitions associated with no users are not present at all in the
input data, so the probability of releasing them has to be 0: the definition
requires pi(0) = 0.
2 Main result
In this section, we define an (ε, δ)-DP partition selection primitive piopt and prove
that the corresponding partition selection strategy is optimal. In this context,
optimal means that it maximizes the probability of releasing a partition with n
users, for all n.
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Definition 3 (Optimal partition selection primitive). A partition selection
primitive piopt is optimal for (ε, δ)-DP if it is (ε, δ)-DP, and if for all (ε, δ)-
DP partition selection primitives pi and all n ∈ N:
pi(n) ≤ piopt (n) .
We introduce our main result, then we prove it in two steps: we first prove
that the optimal partition selection primitive can be obtained recursively, then
derive the closed-form formula of our main result from the recurrence relation.
Theorem 1 (General solution for piopt). Let ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Defining:
n1 = 1 +
⌊
1
ε
ln
(
eε + 2δ − 1
(eε + 1)δ
)⌋
,
n2 = n1 +
⌊
1
ε
ln
(
1 +
eε − 1
δ
(1− piopt (n1))
)⌋
,
and m = n− n1, the partition selection primitive piopt defined by:
piopt (n) =


e
nε
−1
eε−1 · δ if n ≤ n1
(1− e−mε)
(
1 + δ
eε−1
)
+ e−mεpiopt (n1) if n > n1 and n ≤ n2
1 otherwise
is optimal for (ε, δ)-DP.
These formulas assume ε > 0 and δ > 0. We also cover the special cases
where ε = 0 or δ = 0.
Theorem 2 (Special cases for piopt). 1. If δ = 0, partition selection is im-
possible: the optimal partition selection primitive piopt for (ε, 0)-DP is
defined by piopt (n) = 0 for all n.
2. If ε = 0, the optimal partition selection primitive piopt for (0, δ)-DP is
defined by piopt (n) = min (1, nδ) for all n.
2.1 Recursive construction
How do we construct a partition selection primitive pi so that the partition is
output with the highest possible probability under the constraint that pi is (ε, δ)-
DP? Using the definition of differential privacy, the following inequalities must
hold for all n ∈ N.
pi(n+ 1) ≤ eεpi(n) + δ (1)
pi(n) ≤ eεpi(n+ 1) + δ (2)
(1− pi(n+ 1)) ≤ eε(1 − pi(n)) + δ (3)
(1− pi(n)) ≤ eε(1 − pi(n+ 1)) + δ. (4)
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These inequalities are not only necessary, but also sufficient for pi to be DP.
Thus, the optimal partition selection primitive can be constructed by recurrence,
maximizing each value while still satisfying the inequalities above. As we will
show, only inequalities (1) and (4) above need be included in the recurrence
relationship. The latter can be rearranged as:
piopt (n+ 1) ≤ 1− e
−ε(1− piopt (n)− δ)
which leads to the following recursive formulation for piopt.
Lemma 1 (Recursive solution for piopt). Given δ ∈ [0, 1] and ε ≥ 0, piopt
satisfies the following recurrence relationship: piopt (0) = 0, and for all n > 0:
piopt (n) = min
(
eεpiopt (n− 1) + δ, 1− e
−ε(1− piopt (n− 1)− δ), 1
)
(5)
Proof. Let pi0 be defined by recurrence as above; we will prove that pi0 = piopt.
First, let us show that pi0 is monotonic. Fix n ∈ N. It suffices to show for
each argument of the min function in (5) is larger than pi0 (n).
First argument. Since ε ≥ 0 implies eε ≥ 1 and δ ≥ 0, we trivially have
eεpi0 (n) + δ ≥ pi0 (n).
Second argument. We have:
1− e−ε(1 − pi0 (n)− δ) = 1− e
−ε(1− pi0 (n)) + e
−εδ
≥ 1− (1− pi0 (n))
= pi0 (n)
using that 1− pi0 (n) ≥ 0 since pi0 (n) ≤ 1 by (5).
Third argument. This is immediate given (5) and the fact that pi0 (0) = 0.
It follows that pi0 (n+ 1) ≥ pi0 (n).
Because pi0 is monotonic, it immediately satisfies inequalities (2) and (3),
and inequalities (1) and (4) are satisfied by definition.
Since pi0 satisfies all four inequalities above, it is (ε, δ)-DP. Its optimality
follows immediately by recurrence: for each n+ 1, if pi(n+ 1) > piopt (n+ 1), it
cannot be (ε, δ)-DP, as one of the inequalities above is not satisfied: pi0 is the
fastest-growing DP partition selection strategy, and therefore equal to piopt.
Note that the special cases for piopt in Theorem 2 can be immediately derived
from Lemma 1.
2.2 Derivation of the closed-form solution
Let us now show that the closed-form solution of Theorem 1 can be derived
from the recursive solution in 1. First, we show that there is a crossover point
n1, below which only the first term of the recurrence relation matters, and after
which only the second term matters (until piopt (n) reaches 1).
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Lemma 2. Assume ε > 0 and δ > 0. There are crossover points n1, n2 ∈ N
such that 0 < n1 ≤ n2 and
piopt (n) =


0 if n = 0
piopt (n− 1) e
ε + δ if n > 0 and n ≤ n1
1− e−ε (1− piopt (n− 1)− δ) if n > n1 and n ≤ n2
1 otherwise
(6)
Proof. We consider the arguments in the min statement in (5), substituting x
for piopt (n):
α1(x) = e
εx+ δ
α2(x) = 1− e
−ε(1− x− δ)
α3(x) = 1
This substitution allows us to work directly in the space of probabilities instead
of restricting ourselves to the sequence (piopt (n))
∞
n=0. Taking the first derivative
of these functions yields:
α′1(x) = e
ε
α′2(x) = e
−ε
α′3(x) = 0
Since the derivative of α1(x) − α2(x) is e
ε − e−ε > 0, there exists at most one
crossover point x1 such that α1(x) < α2(x) for all x < x1, α2(x1) = α1(x1), and
α1(x) > α2(x) for all x > x1. Setting α1(x) = α2(x) and solving for x yields:
eεx+ δ = 1− e−ε(1− x− δ)
which leads to:
eεx− e−εx = 1− δ − e−ε(1− x− δ)
and finally:
x1 = (1 − δ) ·
1− e−ε
eε − e−ε
.
Since the derivative of α2(x) − α3(x) is e
−ε > 0, there exists at most one
crossover point x2 such that α2(x) < α3(x) for all x < x2, α2(x2) = α3(x2), and
α2(x) > α3(x) for all x > x2. Setting α2(x) = α3(x) and solving for x yields:
x2 = 1− δ.
From the formulas for x1 and x2, it is immediate that 0 < x1 < x2 < 1. As
such, the interval [0, 1] can be divided into three non-empty intervals:
1. On [0, x1], α1(x) is the active argument of min(α1(x), α2(x), α3(x)).
2. On [x1, x2], α2(x) is the active argument of min(α1(x), α2(x), α3(x)).
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3. On [x2, 1], α3(x) is the active argument of min(α1(x), α2(x), α3(x)).
The existence of the crossover points is not enough to prove the lemma: we
must also show that these points are reached in a finite number of steps. For
all n ≥ 1 such that piopt (n) 6= 1, we have:
piopt (n)− piopt (n− 1)
= min
(
eεpiopt (n− 1) + δ, 1− e
−ε (1− piopt (n− 1)− δ)
)
− piopt (n− 1)
≥ min
(
δ,
(
1− e−ε
)
(1− piopt (n− 1)) + e
−εδ
)
≥ e−εδ.
Since piopt (n)−piopt (n− 1) is bounded from below by a strictly positive constant
e−εδ, the sequence achieves the maximal probability 1 for finite n.
This allows us to derive the closed-form solution for n < n1 and for n1 ≤
n < n2 stated in Theorem 1.
Lemma 3. Assume ε > 0 and δ ≤ 0. If n ≤ n1, then piopt (n) =
e
nε
−1
eε−1 · δ. If
n1 ≤ n < n2, then denoting m = n− n1:
piopt (n) =
(
1− e−mε
)(
1 +
δ
eε − 1
)
+ e−mεpiopt (n1) .
Proof. For n < n1, expanding the recurrence relation yields:
piopt (n) = piopt (n− 1) e
ε + δ
= δ
n−1∑
k=0
ekε
=
enε − 1
eε − 1
· δ.
For n1 ≤ n < n2, denotingm = n−n1, expanding the recurrence relation yields:
piopt (n) = 1− e
−ε (1− piopt (n− 1)− δ)
=
(
1− e−ε + δe−ε
)m−1∑
k=0
e−kε + e−mεpiopt (n1)
=
(
1− e−ε + δe−ε
) 1− e−mε
1− e−ε
+ e−mεpiopt (n1)
=
(
1− e−mε
)(
1 +
δ
eε − 1
)
+ e−mεpiopt (n1) .
We can now find a closed-form solution for n1 and for n2.
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Lemma 4. The first crossover point n1 is:
n1 = 1+
⌊
1
ε
ln
(
eε + 2δ − 1
δ(eε + 1)δ
)⌋
Proof. Using the formula for x1 in the proof of Lemma 2, we see that piopt (n− 1) ≤
x1 whenever:
e(n−1)ε − 1
eε − 1
· δ ≤
1− δ
eε + 1
.
Rearranging terms, we can rewrite this inequality as:
n ≤ 1 +
1
ε
ln
[
(1 − δ)(eε − 1)
δ(eε + 1)
+ 1
]
= 1 +
1
ε
ln
[
(1 − δ)(eε − 1) + δ(eε + 1)
δ(eε + 1)
]
= 1 +
1
ε
ln
[
eε + 2δ − 1
δ(eε + 1)
]
.
Since n is an integer, the supremum value defining n1 is achieved by taking the
floor of the right-hand side of this inequality, which concludes the proof.
Lemma 5. The second crossover point n2 is:
n2 = n1 +
⌊
1
ε
ln
(
1 +
eε − 1
δ
(1− piopt (n1))
)⌋
Proof. We want to find the maximal m such that:
(
1− e−mε
)(
1 +
δ
eε − 1
)
+ e−mεpiopt (n1) ≤ 1.
We can rewrite this condition into:
−e−mε
(
1 +
δ
eε − 1
− piopt (n1)
)
≤
−δ
eε − 1
which leads to:
emε ≤
eε − 1
δ
(
1 +
δ
eε − 1
− piopt (n1)
)
≤ 1 +
eε − 1
δ
(1− piopt (n1))
and finally:
m ≤
1
ε
ln
(
1 +
eε − 1
δ
(1− piopt (n1))
)
since m must be an integer, we take the floor of the right-hand side of this
inequality to obtain the result.
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Figure 1: Probability of releasing a partition depending on the number of unique
users, comparing Laplace-based partition selection with piopt. On the left, ε = 1
and δ = 10−5, on the right, ε = 0.1 and δ = 10−10.
3 Numerical validation
Theorem 1 shows that the optimal partition selection primitive piopt outperforms
all other options. How does it compare with the naive strategy of adding Laplace
noise?
Definition 4 (Laplace-based partition selection [KKMN09]). We denote by
Lap(b) a random variable sampled from a Laplace distribution of mean 0 and
of scale b. The following partition selection strategy ρLap, called Laplace-based
partition selection, is (ε, δ)-differentially private:
ρLap(n) =
{
drop if n+ Lap
(
1
ε
)
< 1− ln(2δ)
ε
keep otherwise.
We denote by piLap the corresponding partition selection primitive: piLap(n) =
P [ρLap(n) = keep].
As expected, using the optimal partition selection primitive translates to a
larger probability of releasing a partition with the same user. As exemplified in
Figure 1, the difference is especially large in the high-privacy regime.
To better understand the dependency on ε and δ, we also compare the mid-
point obtained for both partition selection strategies ρ: the number n for which
the probability of releasing a partition with n users is 0.5. For Laplace-based
partition selection, this n is simply the threshold. As Figure 2 shows, the gains
are especially substantial when ε is small, and not significant for ε > 1. Figure 3
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Figure 2: Comparison of the mid-point of the partition selection strategy ρ as
a function of ε, for δ = 10−5.
shows the dependency on δ: for a fixed ε, there is a constant interval between
the midpoints of both strategies. Thus, the relative gains are larger for a larger
δ, since the midpoint is also smaller.
4 Discussion
The approach presented in this work is both easy to implement and efficient.
The random decision for a given partition takes a constant time to compute,
thanks to the closed-form formula of Theorem 1. Counting the number of unique
users per partition can be done in one pass over the data and is massively par-
alellizable. Furthermore, since there is a relatively small value N such that the
probability of keeping a partition with n ≥ N users is 1, the counting process can
be interrupted as soon as a partition reaches N users. This keeps memory us-
age low (in O(N)) without requiring approximate count-distinct algorithms like
HyperLogLog, for which a more complex sensitivity analysis would be needed.
Our approach could, in principle, be extended to cases where each user can
contribute to ∆ > 1 partitions. Following the intuition of Lemma 1, we could
list a set of recursive equations defining piopt (n) as a function of piopt(k) for
k < n. However, this recursive formulation is much more complex when ∆ is
large, for multiple reasons.
1. With ∆ partitions to consider at the same time, the set of possible out-
comes has cardinality 2∆: keep or drop for each partition.
2. To compute piopt (n) by recurrence, we must consider a large set of possible
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Figure 3: Comparison of the mid-point of the partition selection strategy ρ as
a function of δ, for ε = 0.1 (left) and ε = 1 (right).
neighboring databases: each of the other ∆ − 1 contributions of the user
can have anywhere from 0 to n− 1 users. Separately considering all those
(∆− 1)
n
possibilities quickly becomes intractable.
3. For each of these possibilities, the probability can be expressed as a poly-
nomial of degree ∆ in the values of piopt(k), for k < n. Solving these also
becomes intractable as ∆ increases.
The above approach might be workable for ∆ = 2 or even ∆ = 3, but the
complexity cost is likely too high to be worth implementing. Furthermore, the
recurrence-based proof of optimality of piopt only holds assuming that each user
contributes to exactly ∆ partitions in the original dataset, so strategies based
on selecting which partitions to contribute to, or weighing the partition of each
user if there are fewer than ∆, cannot bring additional benefits. This case is
relatively frequent for ∆ = 1, but rarely happens for larger values of ∆.
5 Conclusion
We introduced an optimal primitive for differentially private partition selection,
a special case of differentially private set union where the sensitivity is 1. This
optimal approach is simple to implement and efficient. It outperforms Laplace-
based thresholding; the utility gain is especially significant in the high-privacy
(small ε) regime. This work leaves two open questions. Is it possible to extend
this optimal approach to larger sensitivities in a simple and efficient manner?
Furthermore, is it possible to combine this primitive with existing approaches
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to differentially private set union [GGK+20], like weighted histograms or policy-
based strategies?
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